

Spinning the Past: Why Violent Actors Win Elections

Sarah Zukerman Daly¹

Abstract

Why do citizens elect political actors that used violence against the civilian population? New cross-national data on postwar elections 1970-2010 and sub-national survey, violence and voting data on El Salvador reveal that wartime victimization cannot explain postwar ballots. Instead, the distribution of military power can. I argue that relatively strong belligerents win the ability to spin and propagate the dominant narrative of the violent past. They cast themselves as responsible for peace, thereby gaining retrospective votes and, by boosting their credibility in law and order, win the security valence issue, which cross-cuts cleavages and appeals to swing voters. I find that rebels and incumbents' organizational assets, past public goods provision, and use of electoral intimidation cannot account for the significant link between military and electoral success. This study helps to clarify why people vote in counterintuitive ways and sheds light on political life after violence.

¹ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 217 O'Shaughnessy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556 (email: sarahdaly@nd.edu). I thank Minju Kwon, Camilo Nieto Matiz, and Lucia Tiscornia for research assistance. For very helpful discussions, I am grateful to Allison Carnegie, Alisha Holland, John Ishiyama, Scott Mainwaring, Gwyneth McClendon, and participants at the Berkeley Comparative Politics Colloquium, University of Chicago Program on International Security Policy Seminar, MIT Security Studies Program Seminar, UNC Lethal Aid and Human Security Workshop, George Washington University Institute for Security & Conflict Studies Workshop, University of Chicago Workshop on the State, Violence, and Social Control, Columbia University Junior Faculty Workshop, Yale University Order, Conflict, and Violence Seminar, Notre Dame Comparative Politics Working Group, CWIC, and annual meetings of LASA, APSA, and ISA. I acknowledge funding from the United States Institute of Peace and Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, and Faculty Research Support Program at the University of Notre Dame.

1. INTRODUCTION

During its nearly two decades of armed struggle in Mozambique, RENAMO systematically committed crimes against humanity. It recruited its members, many of them children, through brutal abduction. It engaged in indiscriminate mass killing, rape, and mutilation of civilians as it raided villages and ravaged the country with war (Manning 2008). In 1992, it signed the Rome General Peace Accords and ended its campaign of terror. It became a political party, winning over one-third of citizens' votes in the founding postwar elections.

Around the world, one and a half billion people face such threats of violence. With peace comes the hope for an end to this violence, coercive governance, and undemocratic politics. However, a surprising feature of post-conflict environments is the large number of citizens who, as in Mozambique, vote for political parties with deep roots in the violent organizations of the past. Indeed, despite their use of atrocities, civil war successor parties emerge out of nearly every war termination and remain central figures in the politics of countries transitioning from conflict to peace. This raises an ethically troubling and theoretically provocative question: why do citizens elect candidates that used violence against the civilian population?

Psychology and political science would lead us to anticipate that a population plagued by atrocity should vote against rather than vote for the actors that carried out the violence. Freed from the dictates of wartime survival, citizens should be dominated by anger and a desire for revenge against the violent actors at the polls (Petersen and Daly 2010). When manifest coercion diminishes, past victimization should have lasting political legacies and the electorate should reject its country's victimizers (Balcells 2011; Lupu and Peisakhin Forthcoming).

I test this hypothesis linking victimization and voting using new cross-national data, which I collected on all postwar elections 1970-2010, and sub-national electoral and survey

evidence from the case of El Salvador. I find that, surprisingly, indiscriminately violent rebels and incumbents gained a share of the postwar vote equal to those that exercised restraint in their execution of violence against civilians. Data from El Salvador reveal that these national level patterns manifest at the sub-national level as well, with the most terrorized regions also voting for the victimizers. Survey evidence demonstrates that these patterns are not masking differential voting dynamics among victims and non-victims. Belligerents' wartime violence does not chiefly guide their postwar electoral success.

I argue that it is not objective past violence – the atrocities – that matters, but instead how that violence is spun, justified, perceived, and understood. This “subjective violence” is determined by the narrative of the war that takes hold in the country, which tends to be that crafted by the relatively more powerful belligerent at war's end. In its version of history, the stronger civil war actor casts its opponent, the weaker one, as responsible for the civil war and destruction, and propagates that rule by this belligerent's successor party would return the country to the era of wartime darkness. In contrast, it casts itself as responsible for the peace and reconstruction associated with war termination. In so doing, the relatively stronger actor gains retrospective votes for the gains in security; it justifies its past atrocities as offset by the ultimate result of bringing peace; and it gains credibility in law and order issues, enabling it to win the security valence issue, which often cross-cuts cleavages and appeals to the postwar swing voters. Military strength translates into an ability for the more powerful actor at war's end to control the postconflict “marketplace of ideas” (Snyder and Ballentine 1996) and to broadcast its narrative of the war through its propaganda machine.

I demonstrate empirically that it is not belligerents' organizational assets (cohesion, finances, and territory), past public goods provision, or use of electoral intimidation driving this

strong link between wartime fighting capacity and postwar electoral success, but that military strength produces an ability to write and disseminate history.

In addressing the question of why people elect candidates that used violence against the civilian population, this project contributes to several bodies of scholarship. First, it adds to our understanding of why people vote in counterintuitive ways. This literature examines, for example, why people behave electorally against their material self-interests; lower class voters in the United States support Republican candidates who advocate tax breaks only for the rich (Frank 2004). In India, poor Dalits vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party, whose elite agenda blocks redistributive programmatic policies (Thachil 2014). Related scholarship has explored why citizens vote for candidates with known ties to criminals (Vaishnav 2017), to paramilitaries (Fergusson, Vargas, and Vela 2013), to warlords (Reno 1998), to dictators (Loxton 2014) and to corruption (Arias et al. 2017; de Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kasahara 2013). This project contributes to this scholarship on counterintuitive voting by shedding light on why populations, victimized by civil war belligerents, once they gain peace, vote for these very same individuals to govern their countries.

Second, this project contributes to the literature on post-war politics. We know surprisingly little about the strategic landscape of parties and voters in the aftermath of civil war. There exists an emergent literature on wartime, armed politics (Staniland 2012) and a vast body of scholarship on mainstream, non-violent politics, but almost nothing in between.² This article offers theory to understand and to predict who is likely to dominate the postwar electoral arena, and when politics is likely to remain in the hands of formerly coercive actors. It considers not only parties derived from the rebel side, as is the trend in the literature,³ but also those born from

² An exception is work on postwar democratization: for example, Fortna and Huang (2012).

³ For examples, see Allison (2010); Manning (2008).

the government side. The only theory we have on the latter derives from scholarship on authoritarian successor parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002), only a minority of which emerge from civil war (Levitsky and Way 2012). Armed with knowledge of postwar elections, future analyses can explore the impact of having these types of coercive politicians in office on the quality of democracy and governance.

Third, whereas for goals of human rights and transitional justice, we might wish to erode the influence of former perpetrators of violence, for goals of peace, we are told that it is advisable to have ex-civil war belligerents in government to prevent a “revolving door” back to war. However, the only tests performed to evaluate the relationship between belligerents’ participation in governance and peace have examined the links between election timing and peace (Brancati and Snyder 2012; Flores and Nooruddin 2012); power-sharing and peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007); and rebel-to-party provisions and peace (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016; Matanock 2017). But the *outcomes* of the elections and their relationship to peace have never been looked at. This project offers the first data on election results and thereby enables an understanding of who wins and loses these postwar political contests, and how they behave in the elections’ aftermath.

2. EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF CIVIL WAR SUCCESSOR PARTIES

Why, after suffering wartime atrocities and winning peace, do millions of people around the world elect to live under the rule of political actors with violent pasts?

Wartime Victimization

Insights from psychology and political science would lead us to anticipate that a population plagued by massacres, homicides, kidnappings, rape and extortion should vote against

rather than vote for the actors that carried out those atrocities. Tortured by violence, anger – “the cognition that a group has committed a bad action against one’s self or group” – should dominate citizens’ emotions with the action tendency toward punishing that group. Anger heightens a desire for punishment against a specific actor, and increases prejudice, blame, and exclusionist attitudes (Beber, Roessler, and Scacco 2014; Newhagen 1998). Under the influence of anger, individuals become “intuitive prosecutors” (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999) and should not be able to let go of the past (Petersen and Daly 2010). Given these features of emotions, it is logical to assume that a victimized population would be driven to punitive behavior against its victimizers at the polls.

The relationship between violence and civilian responses has been well studied during times of war. Kalyvas (2006) demonstrates theoretically and empirically that indiscriminate violence backfires with citizens turning against the violent group. Berrebi and Klor (2008); and Kibris (2011) show how terrorist violence creates a civilian backlash against perpetrators of violence in Israel and Turkey respectively. Canetti et al. (2013) find that, through psychological mechanisms, victims of political violence radicalize against their victimizers.

Balcells (2011) extends this analysis to the postconflict environment and illustrates how wartime victimization in Spain triggered revenge and resentment, leading to long-lasting electoral nonsupport for political parties associated with the perpetrators and support for parties with rival identities. In the South Korean context, Hong and Kang (2017) similarly find long-term effects of wartime violence on people’s postwar attitudes toward the incumbent government. In recent work on Crimea, Lupu and Peisakhin (Forthcoming) affirm these legacies,

revealing that descendants of individuals who suffered intensely from indiscriminate Soviet violence hold more hostile attitudes toward Russia.⁴

Of course, not all civil war belligerents perpetrate similar and high levels of atrocity (Stanton 2016). It follows that the most intuitive explanation for the puzzle of civil war successor party success would offer that those victorious at the postwar polls must be those that were restrained in their use of indiscriminate violence. Or, under conditions in which citizens choose between actors who all have skeletons in their closet, citizens should choose the ones that inflicted the least harm; the relative use of violence by the belligerents should matter. This yields the following hypotheses, which mirror each other for the rebel and incumbent parties:

H_{1a}: The electoral success of rebel (incumbent) successor parties should be greater following conflicts in which the rebels (incumbents) carried out only restrained violence.

H_{1b}: The electoral success of rebel (incumbent) successor parties should be greater following conflicts in which the incumbents (rebels) carried out indiscriminate campaigns of atrocities.

H_{1c}: The electoral success of rebel (incumbent) successor parties should be greater following conflicts in which the incumbents (rebels) carried out a greater share of atrocities than the rebels (incumbent).

Spinning a Narrative of the Violent Past

An alternative approach holds that it is not the factual violence that matters (for example, the number or type of atrocities), but the subjective violence: how the past violence is perceived and remembered. This is tied to the narrative of the violence that takes hold in the country, which tends to be that weaved and propagated by the relatively strong belligerent at war's end. In this narrative, the stronger belligerents cast the weaker ones as responsible for the war and destruction, and themselves as credited with "saving" the country, ending the war, and bringing peace. They therefore collect the retrospective votes associated with such improvements in security. These improvements serve to recalibrate citizens' cost-benefit analysis of the stronger

⁴ Scholars such as Bateson (2012); Blattman (2009) examine victimization and political participation, but do not theorize when victims will reject or support perpetrators.

belligerents and potentially render the calculations net positive. This is especially the case because evidence suggests that retrospective voters have a short memory span (Huber, Hill, and Lenz 2012) and thus atrocities in the more distant past may be offset by peace in the recent past.⁵

For the stronger belligerent, its past becomes an electoral asset rather than a liability as it can be used to point to security gains, and thereby boost a reputation for competence and credibility in security issues, and to argue that it will be the best prospective provider of security going forward, promising to protect citizens from disorder and crime (Holland 2013). In so doing, the stronger ex-belligerent can own the ‘security valence issue’ (Egan 2008), one which often cross-cuts cleavages and appeals to contested voters. This is important because belligerents’ social bases tend to be extreme and swing voters tend to exist after war. Achieving electoral success may therefore depend on successors parties’ ability to appeal beyond their wartime constituencies and to gain the support of independent or contested voters.

The relatively stronger actor not only earns the ability to craft the content of a winning narrative of the past, it also usually possesses the apparatus to transmit that narrative via a powerful propaganda machine such that the narrative takes hold among the electorate (Bleck and Michelitch 2017; Boas and Hidalgo 2011).

Following this logic, I predict that the postwar electoral map will depend on the balance of power between the warring factions at war’s end, yielding the hypothesis:

H₂: Relative rebel (incumbent) military strength should correlate with rebel (incumbent) successor party success in the founding postwar elections.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN: CROSS-NATIONAL DATA

In order to test these hypotheses linking voting with victimization and military power, I first construct a new, cross-national dataset of all belligerents that transitioned from civil war in

⁵ Atrocities likely have a slower decay function, but this general logic may still hold.

the years 1970 to 2010. Civil war successor parties are defined as the postwar parties representing the ideological and organizational characteristics of the past rebels and incumbents (Jhee 2008). The database sets the belligerent in a specific conflict episode as the unit of observation, allowing for multi-party civil wars. It draws on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset, which defines civil war as any armed and organized confrontation between government troops and rebel organizations that reaches an annual battle death threshold of twenty-five (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I use the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset to determine whether the conflicts have ended (Kreutz 2010). This dataset defines termination as an active year “followed by a year in which there are fewer than 25 battle-related deaths.” Some conflicts, deemed “ended” by these criteria, did not even briefly demilitarize; the groups merely proved unable to cross this violence threshold for a period. I exclude these groups. Because some of these groups fought multiple conflicts, I count each conflict-group dyad as a separate observation.

Selection

Selection issues may bias the picture I paint of postwar politics. My universe of cases is all conflicts that have ended and held elections. I examine the full set of cases in this universe. Of course, we do not observe the electoral success of groups that chose not to end their fighting, of cases in which elections were not held, or of former belligerents who did not run for office. It may be that groups that believe they will perform dismally in the founding elections choose not to disarm or not to participate in elections.

There are several pieces of evidence that moderate these selection concerns. Many groups in the sample that did run gained less than 1% of the vote. While it is possible that these groups misestimated their electoral success, it is hard to believe that they could have done so by such large margins, suggesting that unpopular groups still do try their hand at the polls. Additionally,

only four groups in the sample boycotted the elections. I code these results as zero and, as a robustness check, drop them from the sample (See Table A.5 in the Appendix). Elections took place in the vast majority of postconflict countries (Flores and Nooruddin 2012) and only four groups were banned from running, indicating that electoral runs by successor parties were widespread; nearly every civil war ended 1970 – 2010 witnessed both the incumbents and rebels participating in elections.

Nonetheless, because war termination and elections are nonrandomly assigned, sound instrumental variables are unlikely, and matching techniques correct only the selection driven by observable factors, I seek to properly specify control variables to account for the potential selection bias (Flores and Nooruddin 2012). I control for five such factors, which may influence the likelihood of conflict termination and elections: external guarantees, veto players, conflict type, war duration, and power-sharing.

I include a variable, *UN intervention*, derived from Brancati and Snyder (2012), which captures whether the UN intervened through mediation, observation, peacekeeping, or enforcement. Such intervention should both provide external guarantees, enabling the actors to end their armed struggles (Fortna 2008; Walter 2002), and also render elections and successor parties more likely because belligerents' participation in politics has become part of the UN's peacebuilding recipe (Matanock 2017). Powersharing should similarly facilitate conflict termination by enabling internal guarantees of the peace terms (Walter 2002). I use the Peace Agreement Dataset's 'shagov' variable (Högbladh 2011), indicating whether power-sharing provisions were present. This variable also helps control for the nature of the electoral system. I include the number of veto players (belligerents who were clearly autonomous, cohesive, and viable), which Cunningham (2006) has demonstrated renders bargaining more challenging, and

war longer. This number of civil war players also may affect the number of parties in the system and both the civil war successors' decision to run in the elections and their vote shares. Finally, from the UCDP dataset, I include a variable capturing war duration and one indicating the nature of the incompatibility because longer lasting conflicts and those fought over territory tend to be harder to resolve (Fearon 2004).

Outcome Variable

Electoral data is collected for the founding elections: the first post-conflict legislative and presidential elections after each episode of civil war.⁶ I also collect data on the second post-conflict elections. As the dependent variable, this research uses the valid vote share of a successor party. Information about the electoral vote share is collected from various print and electronic sources including Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut (1999); Birch (2003); Grotz, Hartmann, and Nohlen (2001); Nohlen (2005a, 2005b); Nohlen and Stöver (2010); Political Handbook of the World (1999); African Elections Database; Congressional Research Service Reports on the Middle East and the Arab World; Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe; Political Database of the Americas; Parties and Elections in Europe;⁷ the official websites of relevant governments, and other sources.⁸

On average, rebel successor parties gained approximately 18.2% of the valid votes in the founding postconflict elections; the incumbent successor parties won an average of 40.1% of the votes. Electoral success varied significantly.

Explanatory Variables

⁶ I define post-conflict at the dyad rather than country level. I focus on the legislative elections, which presented lower barriers to participation.

⁷ See <http://africanelections.tripod.com>; <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/elecdata.html>;

www.essex.ac.uk/elections; <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/elecdata.html>; www.parties-andelections.de

⁸ I also consulted Keesing's Record of World Events; Lexis-Nexis Academic; Pro-Quest Historical Newspaper Databases; CIA World Factbook; US State Department Reports; Library of Congress Country Reports; BBC Country Profiles, Latin American Election Statistics; and Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles.

To operationalize atrocities and evaluate H_{1a} and H_{1b} , I construct two dummy variables – *gov_abuse* and *rebel_abuse* – which capture whether the incumbents and rebels respectively used the most severe forms of civilian abuse or restrained from this behavior. I rely on the coding criteria and data of Stanton (2016, 67-8):

Strategies of restraint are characterized by deliberate efforts to avoid attacking civilian targets ... A government or rebel group is coded as having exercised restraint if it did not engage in any of the following four forms of indiscriminate violence against civilians: massacres; scorched earth campaigns; cleansing of a particular ethnic or religious group; or deliberate bombing and shelling of civilian targets.

For missing data, I consult the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2015) and qualitative sources. Roughly half of all rebel and incumbent actors exhibited restraint in their use of atrocities.

To evaluate Hypothesis 1c, I construct a variable, *relative_abuse*, which assumes a value of “1 if the rebel group was restrained in its use of violence while the government carried out indiscriminate violence (16% of cases); “2” if both actors exercised restraint (34% of cases); “3” if both sides carried out indiscriminate violence (41%); and “4” if the government exercised restraint while the rebels conducted campaigns of indiscriminate atrocity (9%).

To capture the distribution of relative strength and test H_2 , I rely on data from the UCDP termination dataset on the means of conflict termination⁹ and the indicator *rebstrength*, from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset on the strength of the rebels relative to the government at war’s end (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2012). I combine the indicators to create a measure – *military_distr* – ranging from “0” to “8” where “0” indicates outright government victory and “1” low activity in which the government is the victor. The observations coded in the middle categories of the scale – “3” to “6” – ended their conflicts through a peace agreement, ceasefire agreement, or low activity characterized by military stalemate. For these cases in which no actor

⁹ I use qualitative information to recode “low activity” to reflect the military balance of power.

was victorious, I use the *rebstrength* variable to determine the relative military advantage with “2” representing the case of stalemate, but much weaker rebels; “3” stalemate with weaker rebels; “4” parity; “5” stalemate with stronger rebels and “6” stalemate with much stronger rebels. Finally, “7” represents “low activity” in which the rebel group is the victor; and a value of “8” is assigned to cases in which the rebel is the outright victor. Twenty percent of the belligerents ended their armed struggle with the government emerging victorious (“0” or “1”); 3% terminated in rebel victory (“7” or “8”). The remaining 75% of the observations ceased their fighting in stalemate with 2% exhibiting much stronger rebels; 13% parity; 43% weaker rebels; and 20% much weaker rebels.

Estimation

To test Hypotheses 1-2, I consider a series of regression models on two different samples:¹⁰ 1) rebel successor parties; and 2) incumbent successor parties. My main specifications use ordinary least squares. A number of countries in the dataset have experienced multiple civil wars; to account for the nonindependence of these observations within countries, I present robust standard errors, clustered on the country unit.

Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 test H_{1a} : the effect of one’s own group’s atrocities, Models 3 and 4 analyze H_{1b} : the influence of one’s enemy’s atrocities, and Models 5-6 test H_{1c} : the impact of relative atrocities. Table 2, Models 1-2 reveal the effect of military strength on postwar electoral outcomes and Models 3-8 evaluate the combined equation with varying operationalization of the victimization variables. Table A.4 in the Appendix evaluates the hypotheses in the sub-samples of ethnic and non-ethnic wars. The victimization hypothesis may operate less strongly in ethnic conflicts in which intergroup bias overwhelms the impact of

¹⁰ Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix present summary statistics.

atrocities on political allegiances (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013).

4. RESULTS: CROSS-NATIONAL DATA

The central finding of the cross-national analysis is that rebel and incumbents' wartime use of atrocities cannot account for citizens' subsequent decision of whether or not to vote for these belligerents' successor parties. In Table 1, we can see that the signs of the coefficients are consistent with the victimization logic: gross violations of human rights by the rebel group had a dampening effect on the rebel successor party's electoral success (Model 1), and atrocities by the incumbent had a boosting effect on rebel party vote share (Model 3). Strangely, however, incumbent atrocities increased incumbent successor vote share (Model 2) and rebel atrocities diminished incumbent success (Model 4). Rebels that perpetrated campaigns of indiscriminate brutality while their government opponents exercised restraint were, on average, punished more at the polls. However, the inverse does not hold for the incumbents. *None* of these relationships between victimization and voting are significant across any of the specifications of the models.¹¹

<<INSERT TABLE1 ABOUT HERE.>>

Following the logic that citizens may vote for their co-ethnic party, even if it had been horrifically violent, Table A.4 in the Appendix breaks down the sample into ethnic and non-ethnic wars, drawing on the classification of Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010). The puzzling null results hold across the sub-samples, suggesting that the lack of a relationship between atrocities and ballots is not being driven by identity conflicts.

¹¹ The analyses reveal that none the controls are related to postwar electoral results. The closest to achieving statistical significance is the number of veto players, which has a negative coefficient, an intuitive result. See Table A.3 in the Appendix.




Figure 1. Rebel Victimization and Rebel Vote Share




Figure 2. Incumbent Victimization and Incumbent Vote Share

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the overall null results for the rebel and incumbent successor parties respectively. The dark grey displays the average vote share for parties derived from belligerents that committed indiscriminate mass atrocities whereas the light gray shows the vote share for parties with roots in organizations that exercised only restrained violence. We can see that, despite varying greatly in their wartime execution of brutality, these parties differed little in their postwar electoral success.

One possible explanation for these null effects could be classical measurement error. It is notoriously difficult to collect data on, and assign responsibility for human rights violations, especially across nations. I rely on Stanton (2016)'s binary categorization, which displays less noisiness and missingness than, for example, fatality numbers. Cross-national analysis of victimization and voting also presents ecological inference issues. To overcome these two challenges, I turn in Section 6 to sub-national and individual-level evidence from El Salvador.

<<INSERT TABLE2 ABOUT HERE.>>

The cross-national data suggest that there may be more to the story than how much objective violence the belligerents unleashed against the civilian population in the past. These data reveal instead that the distribution of military power at war's end proves a powerful predictor of the first postwar elections. Consistent with H₂, the measures of the military balance

of power are highly correlated with both the incumbent and rebel electoral outcomes across all specifications of the model. Model 1 in Table 2 demonstrates that militarily strong rebels at war’s end perform significantly better in postwar voting than militarily weak ones. Model 2 in Table 2 suggests that the same holds for incumbents (recall that the military balance scale is decreasing in incumbent power). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate these results for rebels and incumbents respectively, with the vote share on the y-axis and the military distribution of power on the x-axis.




Figure 3. Distribution of Power and Rebel Vote Share




Figure 4. Distribution of Power and Incumbent Vote Share

5. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS LINKING MILITARY & ELECTORAL SUCCESS

To understand this significant correlation, I propose a logic in which militarily effective belligerents leverage their strength to spin and disseminate¹² a story of the violent past for which they gain retrospective and prospective security votes. However, military strength could work through a variety of alternative mechanisms to affect postwar voting patterns. I outline three alternative mechanisms – electoral coercion, organizational assets, and public goods provision. I engage them using the cross-national data here and, in Section 6, explore them with sub-national

¹² To evaluate the mechanism of propaganda control, I examine Freedom House’s Freedom of Press indicators. Unfortunately, postwar environments exhibit insufficient variation in these indicators.

evidence from El Salvador.

Electoral Intimidation and Coercion

It may be that the puzzling regularity of votes for actors with violent pasts can be explained by the fact that the votes are not actually voluntary (Mares 2015). Instead, they are coerced in an environment in which the elections are neither free nor fair. Fergusson et al. (2013), for example, argue that, in Colombia, paramilitary-allied politicians gained votes through the continued use of assassinations, displacement, and massacres. We should expect relatively stronger belligerents to be better positioned to engage in such electoral coercion.

To capture this possible mechanism and evaluate whether voter intimidation, itself tied to military power, is driving the electoral results, I derive a measure from Freedom House for whether the elections were “free and fair.” *Coercion* is a 7-point scale on which “1” refers to a country that enjoys a wide range of political rights, has free and fair elections, is competitive, and guarantees the rights and representation of the opposition and minorities. A country with a rating of “7” has few or no political rights.¹³ This indicator better captures incumbent election violations. Whereas country-specific reports document voter fraud on both sides, no systematic data exist across all countries on former rebels’ interference in elections.

<<INSERT TABLE3 ABOUT HERE.>>

I first regress electoral intimidation on the military distribution of power (Table 3, Model 1). In Models 7-8, I use as the outcomes the vote shares for the rebel and incumbent successor parties respectively, and as the explanatory factor, electoral intimidation, controlling for all other covariates. The results suggest that military strength is not significantly associated with electoral intimidation. While coerced votes invariably exist, there are also voluntary votes in these elections. The link between military and electoral strength manifests in elections that were free

¹³ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2017>.

and fair and also in those that were not.

A second story of coercion, compatible with the cross-national results, holds that electorates vote for the relatively stronger actor not because they endorse them due to an effective spinning of the violent past, but because they fear them. Specifically, they fear that, were they not to vote for them, they would spoil the peace and return to war. Voters act strategically, in line with our international relations theories. Empirically, this story has its strongest telling in the Liberian case. Lyons (2002, 14) writes: “Many Liberians believed that if Charles Taylor, the most powerful factional leader, lost the election, the country would return to war ... Many Liberians ... used their franchise to appease the powerful former militia leader.”

Several pieces of evidence disfavor the generalizability of this mechanism. First, this logic should work best where the risk of war recurrence is highest. However, the link between military strength and electoral success plays out even controlling for variables associated with a return to war. Second, if this protection racket logic is correct, as the threat of war recurrence erodes over time, so too should the vote share for the militarily strong successor party. Instead, the cross-national data suggest a great deal of continuity in vote shares over time, with a correlation between the first and second elections of 0.7. Electoral success withstands a change in the risk of remilitarization. Third, this spoiler logic depends on strong belligerents returning to war if they lose elections (or populations believing they will). Looking at the outliers in the dataset (militarily strong actors that underperformed in the elections according to the model), I find that they did not tend to return to war. The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), for example, despite achieving military parity with the Djibouti government, upon winning only 17% of the vote in the founding election, nonetheless continued along its peaceful political path. Fourth, successor parties do not seem to use the threat of

remilitarization as a centerpiece of their campaign strategies; instead, they often try to sell themselves as the parties of peace (Ryan 2017). Finally, if voters elect the militarily stronger actors out of fear, they would not necessarily *like* the ex-victimizees, but would only vote for them. However, survey evidence suggests that citizens' attitudes toward the successor parties correspond closely with their voting behavior.

Organizational Assets

A second alternative mechanism linking fighting capacity and electoral performance centers on organizational weapons: unity, financing, and territory. Stronger belligerents may, for example, exhibit higher levels of cohesion, which facilitates both their success on the battlefield and performance at the polls. Levitsky and Way (2012, 870) find that cohesion, built through a history of "sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict," confers to the movements hardened identities, solidarity networks, and military-style internal discipline, which serve their successor parties well in postwar elections. In other words, relatively strong belligerents may just be better at organizing and this is why they win elections.

I test this mechanism with an indicator from the NSA dataset, *strengthcent*, which is a scale (low, moderate, high) measuring the extent to which a central command exercises control over the constituent groups of an insurgent movement. As Table 3 shows, cohesion is uncorrelated with military strength using conventional levels of significance (Model 2) and cohesion, in turn, does not seem to influence postwar votes (Models 7-8).

Stronger belligerents likely also enjoy more robust financing. Such wartime funding may be fungible to also bankroll postwar clientelism and campaigns, boosting electoral performance. To capture rebels' access to resources, I use a variable from Huang (2016), which assumes a value of "1" if the rebel group depended systematically on profits from the extraction, sale or

trade of natural resources such as diamonds, minerals, timber, and metals or from illicit activities such as narcotics trading and other contraband. For missing values, I use data from Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) and Fearon (2004). Approximately one-third of the observations in the cross-national dataset exhibited resource-richness. Table 3, Model 3 reveals a negative, but statistically insignificant, correlation between resource richness and military strength. Models 7-8 cast doubt on this mechanism, revealing that robust financing from natural resources is seemingly unrelated to postwar electoral results.

The military distribution of power also could be capturing variation in territorial control. Stronger actors may exercise influence over greater swaths of the country and, if voters electorally support the former belligerents that controlled their territory, these belligerents' parties may face more promising electoral fates (Allison 2010).

I operationalize territorial control by combining NSA's *terrcont*, an indicator for whether the rebel group controls territory, and *effterrcont*, a measure of the degree of control. The combined scale ranges from "0" for no control to "3" for high levels of control. As Table 3 demonstrates, greater territorial control is positively associated with military strength as anticipated, but not with electoral performance.

Public Goods Provision

The final alternative mechanism that may account for the robust relationship in the cross-national data between military power and electoral success centers on past public goods provision. The literature on voting argues that the electorate bases its vote choices on and rewards parties for past economic performance (Fiorina 1981). More powerful belligerents are potentially in a better position to provide governance, deliver public goods, and avert economic crisis during war (Kalyvas 2006), material benefits for which they may gain retrospective

economic votes (Jhee 2008). This economic performance may also buy them prospective votes as the ability to distribute material benefits signals to the electorate competence in governance.

Like security gains, material benefits would serve to offset the atrocities committed. This echoes the narrative of dictators such as Pinochet whose gross violations of human rights were, in the eyes of a large minority of Chileans, overshadowed by the economic growth they enjoyed after Pinochet “saved” the country from economic crisis at Allende’s hands (Loxton 2014). On a micro level, Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2011) reveal how material benefits served to win the hearts and minds of the victimized civilian population in Afghanistan. In Iraq, Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) show that the Commander’s Emergency Response public goods program generated relative collaboration with U.S. and Iraqi forces, irrespective of their use of atrocities.

To test this proposed mechanism, I measure rebels’ provision of material benefits using a dummy variable from Huang (2016) for rebel social service provision, which assumes a value of “1” if the rebels provided education or created their own schools; offered health care, built hospitals or founded clinics; or engaged in humanitarian relief operations to address war-related humanitarian issues; “0” otherwise. Forty-four percent of the sample engaged in this form of public goods provision.

To capture the incumbents’ economic performance, I derive data on perceptions of economic crisis from the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012) and distinguish between founding postwar elections preceded by economic crisis, coded “1,” and those preceded by no crisis, coded “0.” Nearly half of the transitioning actors faced an economy in crisis.

Table 3, Models 5 and 6 regress these aspects of goods provision on the military distribution of power and demonstrate no significant relationship between the variables. The

estimated sign on the *rebel services* and *economic crisis* coefficients in Models 7 and 8 prove consistent with the expectations – rebel public goods and economic downturns boosted rebels’ vote shares and dampened incumbents’. However, the coefficients’ 90% confidence intervals include the possibility of no effect in each of the models. The findings suggest that, in postwar politics, voters do not punish incumbents that reigned over periods of economic bust and do not reward rebels who engaged in patronage. While wartime politics may quickly revert to mainstream politics, in the first round of postwar elections, citizens seem to engage not in economic retrospective voting, but in security voting.

6. SUB-NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA ON EL SALVADOR

To explore these relationships between military strength and voting in greater depth, and to see whether the null results of victimization hold at the sub-national level, I complement the cross-national analysis with a case study of El Salvador.

Civil war ravaged El Salvador from 1979 to 1992. The origins of the war lie in the escalating grievances of the preceding decades. Rural landlessness grew from 12% in 1961 to 41% in 1975. Urban unemployment increased; shantytowns grew; living conditions deteriorated; and fraudulent 1972 elections undermined the peaceful route to political change. In response, the country witnessed mass mobilization to pressure the government for reform. Rather than enact reform, the state instead engaged in indiscriminate repression. It did so through its security forces and through large-scale, organized death squads and militias (Stanley 1996). This repression turned a divided, apolitical, peaceful social movement into a united, revolutionary, and violent one in the form of the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas (Daly 2011). It drove recruits into the arms of the rebels and afforded them popular support, camouflage from the government, and the resources necessary to fund their high-risk insurgency (Wood 2003).

The civil war finally terminated in a negotiated settlement, the Chapultepec Accords, in 1992. Two years later, in 1994, founding elections were held. In these elections, the ARENA party, derived from the counterinsurgent death squads, won 49.3% of the presidential vote and 39 of 84 of the legislative seats. The FMLN, successor to the guerrilla armies, won 25.6% of the presidential vote and 21 of 84 of the legislative seats. Using sub-national data on violence and elections, survey evidence of voters' attitudes, and qualitative information on parties' campaigns, I seek to understand why both of these parties with violent pasts performed well electorally and why ARENA outperformed the FMLN.

Wartime Victimization and Postwar Voting

The Salvadoran civil war took the lives of at least 70,000 in a country of five million and left over one million refugees (Stanley 1996). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) revealed the highly asymmetrical nature of the atrocities. While the FMLN “assassinated opposition mayors, forcibly recruited civilians to fight on its behalf, kidnapped wealthy businessmen for ransom, and engaged in widespread acts of economic terrorism” (Allison 2010), ARENA’s atrocities far outnumbered those of the FMLN and took on a horrific character. The TRC estimated that the incumbent side was responsible for 95% of the political killing, the guerrillas 5% (United Nations 1993). In 1980 alone, approximately 12,000 people were killed, most “either captured and executed by the death squads or killed in wholesale massacres carried out by government forces in rural areas” (Stanley 1996, 179). These massacres began to assume massive proportions with death tolls in each climbing to 1,000 individuals. State-sponsored forces left their abducted, tortured, and murdered victims’ bodies “in designated locations that became so commonplace that they inspired a neologism: ‘body dumps’” (Loxton 2014). By the victimization hypothesis, one should expect that the FMLN and ARENA, both with blood on

their hands, should have been punished in the postwar elections, and that the FMLN party, derived from the relatively restrained rebels, should have easily beaten ARENA, tied to the indiscriminately terrorist state.

Outside observers also held these expectations. They “were initially skeptical about ARENA’s prospects [in the founding postwar elections]. In the U.S. Embassy, for example, the consensus was reportedly that ‘[ARENA’s leader, Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, is] just a right-wing extremist. He can’t get any support.’”¹⁴ Even the successor parties themselves were certain that revenge would drive voting. For example, “in many towns that served as military outposts on the edges of FMLN zones of control, town residents suffered from the guerrilla attacks; so, in the 1994 election, FMLN campaigners acknowledged that ‘naturally we have to pay a political cost for the war damage.’”¹⁵ Instead, despite the “damage” the FMLN caused, it gained a sizeable share of the votes, and, despite its mass atrocities, ARENA won nearly half of the electorate’s votes.

Understanding the Null Results of Victimization

It could be that the electorate did not know of the successor parties’ ties to the violent organizations of the past. This explanation, however, finds little support. As candidates, the FMLN party ran known guerrilla commanders and it was widely recognized as the direct inheritance of the rebel movement (Wolf 2009). The ARENA party, meanwhile “was the ‘aboveground alter ego’ of El Salvador’s notorious ‘death squad’ networks” (Pyes 1983, 1). Indeed, no individual was more closely associated with the explosion of death squad violence than ARENA party leader D’Aubuisson who was described by one former U.S. ambassador as a

¹⁴ Quoted in Dickey (1982).

¹⁵ Quoted in Stahler-Sholk (1995).

“pathological killer.”¹⁶

It could be that the national level patterns mask sub-national ones in which victimized regions voted against the perpetrators whereas non-victimized regions accounted for the puzzling vote share for the civil war belligerents. Allison (2010), for example, finds that conflict zones were more likely to vote for the FMLN than non-conflict zones. However, his study does not disaggregate the violence by perpetrator. Anecdotally, the civil war ravaged rural communities, primarily in the north and east of the country. And yet, the highly abusive incumbent swept rural areas, those most victimized by the war (Vickers, Spence, and Huff 1994). Meanwhile, only 5 percent of human rights abuses reported to the Truth Commission occurred in major cities. The restrained FMLN won these urban areas, which had largely escaped the violence.

To better estimate these sub-national patterns, I analyze municipal level election results and break the atrocities down by perpetrator – government or rebel – using data from the Truth Commission.¹⁷ I find that a higher number of incumbent atrocities – disappearances, homicides, kidnappings, torture, and rapes – was associated with dampened ballots for the ARENA party. However, the effect is small. Fifty additional atrocities, for example, would have lowered ARENA’s vote share by only 0.009. Meanwhile, surprisingly, greater levels of FMLN abuse, on average, was associated with higher vote shares for the guerrilla successor party, and the relative violence committed by the government versus rebels had no relationship with postwar electoral success. ARENA’s vote share remained constant whether it was responsible for 0% of the atrocities in the municipality or 100%. Figures 5-7 illustrate these results. Subnational ballots seemingly also largely defy the victimization hypotheses.

¹⁶ Robert White, quoted in Loxton (2014).

¹⁷ I am extremely grateful to Michael Allison for sharing these election data and to the University of North Texas for digitalizing the TRC data.




Figure 5. FMLN Municipal-Level Abuse and Votes




Figure 6. ARENA Municipal-Level Abuse and Votes




Figure 7. Relative Abuse and ARENA Votes at the Municipal-Level

Finally, it could be that the puzzling national and sub-national patterns of voting for victimizers reflects the ballots of non-victims, but that victims voted as anticipated: that is, FMLN victims voted for ARENA and government victims voted for the FMLN. To test this hypothesis, I use the Americas Barometer survey from 1995, which asked respondents whether they had lost a member of their family or close relative as a result of the armed conflict. The question does not ask the political identity of the perpetrator. However, given that the survey was administered on a representative sample of Salvadorans and the government committed 95% of

atrocities and the FMLN 5%, we should anticipate that 5% of reported victims in the survey would support ARENA and 95% of victims would support the FMLN. Instead we find the following electoral dynamics: 40% of victims voted for ARENA while 24% of victims cast votes for the FMLN (Figure 8).




Figure 8. Perpetrators of Atrocity and Victims' Votes

The national, sub-national and individual patterns of voting in El Salvador do not directly follow the patterns of victimization, echoing the findings at the cross-national level.

Military Strength and Postwar Voting

Instead, as in the cross-national data, the military balance of power seemingly guided electoral results in El Salvador. The FMLN was locked in a stalemate with the Salvadoran military (Wood 2003). The Salvadoran state was unlikely to be able to “defeat the insurgents militarily” (Montgomery 1983) and military victory was “similarly out of the [FMLN’s] own reach” (Manning 2008, 118). While stalemated, the government was stronger relative to the FMLN, as indicated in the NSA data. The vote share reflected this distribution of military power. The Salvadoran case therefore enables an exploration of the mechanisms by which successor parties gain votes at levels commensurate with their fighting strength.

I find that ARENA’s superior military strength won it an invaluable electoral weapon: the

ability to craft and propagate the dominant version of El Salvador's past. ARENA scripted a narrative in which "any blame for the war and its destruction was laid squarely on the FMLN" (Wolf 2009). It ran "anonymous ads" frequently on Salvadoran television before the March 20 elections in which:

The camera focuses close-up on drawing paper and a small hand with a crayon sketching a female figure. A child's voice-over says 'this is mommy,' and goes on to draw a second male figure identified as 'daddy.' The hand then sketches a third smaller figure identified as 'me.' The drawing of 'me' has only one leg, and the small voice says that this is the result of a [FMLN] terrorist mine. The child's soft voice tells viewers that the [FMLN] terrorists are hoping people will forget, but the child doesn't think mommy and daddy will forget (Vickers et al. 1994).

ARENA painted the FMLN candidates as responsible for the horrific and "vivid memories of the war" and warned that a FMLN government would rule as it had during the war: violently. In other words, ARENA used the victimization narrative, conjuring up images of the FMLN's violent past. However, rather than do so objectively, acknowledging its own role in perpetrating 95% of the atrocities, instead it spun a version of history in which the "terrorist" FMLN had unleashed all wartime violence (CIDAI 2004a, b).

In contrast, ARENA tried to distance itself from the war and spun its own past use of violence as justified by the ultimate achievement of peace and order. As the relatively stronger actor, it sought credit for bringing an end to the war. "During electoral campaigning, references to D'Aubuisson and his 'invaluable services' to the fatherland permeate[d] party propaganda" (Sprenkels 2011, 22). In the words of an ARENA founder: "Nothing done to defend your country is against the law" (Loxton 2014); ARENA's violent means should be forgiven by the fact that ARENA eventually terminated the conflict. As the party documents justified, "Before ARENA's political struggle, there was chaos, demagoguery, deception, [and] disrespect for life and all values." ARENA liberated the victimized El Salvador from this fate. It comprised not "death

squad' members, but "warriors of liberty," to quote the title of a book by one ARENA founder (Panamá 2005). When President Antonio Saca inaugurated a plaza in D'Aubuisson's honor in San Salvador, he praised D'Aubuisson for having saved El Salvador from "the tragedy of Marxist totalitarianism" (Loxton 2014). ARENA thereby framed itself not as the party of wartime violence, stuck in the past, but as the party of peace, enabling to it capture retrospective security votes, and to modernize and move on to other issues concerning the electorate for which its past would prove an advantage.

Of course, the FMLN had its own narrative of the war, which it sought to propagate. However, in this postwar marketplace of ideas, the stronger ARENA gained control of the telling of history: its spinning of the narrative worked! Polls reveal that at least 51% of the electorate viewed the FMLN with some degree of hostility, blaming it, rather than ARENA, for the war and economic destruction (LAPOP 1991). The rebels were even held accountable for national economic conditions for which the incumbent is usually credited or blamed. In the 1991 LAPOP survey, 50% of the population blamed the war for limiting economic growth and causing low levels of employment, and more than twice as many people blamed the "guerrillas' destruction," rather than the government's public policies, for these economic woes. Moreover, polls indicate that more Salvadorans gave credit to ARENA, than to the FMLN, for the years of peace preceding the elections (Vickers et al. 1994). Problems with the peace accords were blamed on the FMLN (47% compared with 23% on ARENA).¹⁸ ARENA was viewed by half of the population as the party, which "most favors the pursuit of peace." And the peace accords, in citizens' estimation, were bringing gains in security on which the ARENA "peace" party could

¹⁸ LAPOP 1991.

capitalize (IUDOP 1992).¹⁹

Perhaps most remarkably, the narrative worked to repaint the blame for the wartime atrocities. Whereas the Truth Commission found the state-sponsored forces responsible for 95% of the violence and the rebels 5%, in a 1991 LAPOP survey, 32% of the population believed the FMLN had had *less* respect for human rights and abused the Salvadoran population *more* whereas only 17% believed that the government side had had less respect for human rights and had been more abusive.

ARENA further succeeded in painting itself as the best provider of security going forward. To win valence issues, those on which nearly all voters agree, parties must demonstrate competence, credibility, expertise, and past performance on the issues (Egan 2008). On the security valence issue, militarily strong ARENA could do this. It translated its fighting strength into a party brand of security, and credibly asserted that it could save the citizenry from future threats, including crime and threats to law and order (Wantchekon 1999). A majority of the population viewed ARENA as the party best able to fulfill the peace accords and fight crime.²⁰ Moreover, the electorate seemed to value these security credentials in their selection of an executive. When asked in 1992 what characteristics the next Salvadoran president must have, respondents answered “watching over the population,” protecting it. Surprisingly, the population placed little weight on leaders being capable or democratic, helping the poor, or creating jobs (IUDOP 1992).

Important to the power of ARENA’s narrative was that both the retrospective and prospective security stories were non-ideological and non-sector specific; rather, they aimed to

¹⁹ Those who perceived security improvements were much more likely to vote for ARENA than those that did not (57% as opposed to 23%) (LAPOP 1991).

²⁰ Support for ARENA was eight percentage points higher, and intent to vote for ARENA was 15 points higher among individuals who considered crime the most pressing national problem (LAPOP 1995; IUDOP 1994).

make programmatic linkages (Holland 2013). In this way, the narrative enabled ARENA to appeal beyond its core wartime constituencies to shift swing voters concerned with a valence issue that tended to transcend class and ideology cleavages and to be highly salient following war: security.²¹

Swing voters were the *key* to the founding elections. In October 1992, 62% of the Salvadoran electorate was unaligned. In October 1993, 51% remained undecided and neither the incumbent party nor the rebel one commanded a partisan majority (IUDOP). Based on information on rebel and incumbent territorial control from Cienfuegos (1982); McClintock (1998); McElhinny (2006), at war's end, 65% of Salvadoran municipalities constituted "contested" territory. The story ARENA spun of the past resonated with this broader, swing and unaligned electorate. ARENA won 49% of the vote in disputed municipalities compared to FMLN's 16%. It won the contested voters²² and a multi-sector electoral coalition (Loxton 2014) "across regions and classes" (Wood 2000, 225). With this coalition, it won the postwar elections.

Of course, all actors with violent legacies try to respin their past (Grzymala-Busse 2002). They do so in different ways including contrition, distancing, deflection, scape-goating, and obfuscation. The question is not only how they do so, but when their story takes hold. I argue that the militarily stronger actor, in this case ARENA, not only gains control of the content of the narrative, but also access to propaganda and mobilization machines to amplify and spread that narrative.

ARENA inherited the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN), a mass-based

²¹ In 1994, the homicide rate in El Salvador was 138 per 100,000 inhabitants, exceeding the rate at the height of the war in 1982 of 55.3 (Cruz and González 1997). Security issues concerned socioeconomic groups in roughly equal proportions (IUDOP 1994; LAPOP 1995). 48% of unaligned voters stated that crime was the most salient issue facing the country (IUDOP 1994).

²² 49% of swing voters said that, if they had to choose a party, they would choose ARENA; 12% said they would choose the left (LAPOP 1991).

“para-political” association, which D’Aubuisson “retrofit ... for his own purposes” (Loxton 2014, 447) to be the “organizational core of the new party” (Stanley 1996, 232). ORDEN “penetrated every hamlet in the country” (Americas Watch 1991, 5). By conservative estimates, “at least one Salvadoran out of every 50 was an informant for the agency” (Pyes 1983, 6). Approximations of ORDEN’s membership vary, but most scholars agree on a figure around 100,000 (Loxton 2014). With a massive membership and geographic reach, ORDEN therefore proved an ideal intelligence network through which to transmit ARENA’s narrative. To spread the story, ORDEN held mass rallies, took out advertisements in newspapers, engaged in sophisticated public relations, and participated in other forms of grassroots dissemination (Loxton 2014; Wood 2000).

A study by Hemisphere Initiatives conducted midway through the founding postwar campaign found that ARENA’s advertising time on television and radio averaged 5-14 times that of the FMLN (Stahler-Sholk 1995). This broadcasting advantage afforded ARENA the opportunity to run a variety of ads, and run them often (Vickers et al. 1994). This proved especially helpful to targeting swing voters. In contrast, the FMLN, while having propaganda apparatuses, including the renowned Radio Venceremos, proved unable to “adequately target specific campaign messages to key sectors of the electorate, in particular women, youth, and rural voters, in which it knew its support was weak” (Vickers et al. 1994).²³ As a result, ARENA proved better able to capture independent voters and carry the elections.

Alternative Mechanisms

I have argued that militarily stronger ARENA’s ability to spin and disseminate a

²³ FMLN likely proved better able to control the narrative in its strongholds, which may have contributed to its superior performance (10 percentage points) in these areas.

favorable version of history won it the founding elections. However, it is worth exploring whether the distribution of military strength brought ARENA this electoral victory instead through alternative mechanisms: an ability to coerce the electorate, to better organize, or to gain economic votes.

Electoral Coercion

As in the cross-national data, the electoral coercion mechanism also finds little empirical support in the Salvadoran case. While there were procedural irregularities around voter registration during the first postwar elections (Stahler-Sholk 1995), all of the presidential, legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador were “deemed to be free and fair” (Wade 2008, 23). Additionally, as Vickers et al. (1994) document: “the ‘irregularities’ did not affect the national results. Only the outcomes of a small number of municipal races as well as one or two deputy seats may have been affected.” There was not manifest voter intimidation or fraud; rather the results were “accepted by contenders and observers alike” (Wolf 2009, 452).

Wantchekon (1999) makes a compelling case for the related protection racket logic in El Salvador: vote for me and I won’t return to war. However, evidence suggests that, while insecurity remained highly salient at the time of the founding elections, the electorate predominantly feared crime, not a return to war (IUDOP 1992-94). Additionally, those who believed that political violence was a large or very large threat to the stability of the country were *less* likely (by 10 percentage points) to vote for ARENA in the founding elections (LAPOP 1991). In the IUDOP 1994 post-election survey, only 5% believed that citizens had voted for ARENA out of fear of a return to war. Additionally, ARENA performed well electorally for over a decade, long after war recurrence remained a likely outcome.

Organizational Assets (Cohesion, Finances, and Territory)

Evidence from El Salvador similarly reinforces the null results of the organizational asset mechanisms at the cross-national level. ARENA was deemed to be “capable of managing internal tensions without significant schisms... [and] broadly united” (Wood 2000, 248). Nonetheless, it was built on the foundation of hundreds of militias (ORDEN) and it is unclear how centralized and unified these militias really were. As quoted in Vickers et al. (1994), “to talk about the cohesiveness of ARENA is an overstatement. There is very, very serious internal fighting within the ARENA party.” ARENA, however, did remain a single party and had experience as a party, having competed in the 1980s demonstration elections. In contrast, the FMLN lacked electoral experience and was made up of five different organizations, which “maintained their own leadership and organizational structure throughout the war” (Wade 2008, 23). “FMLN’s Achilles’ heel ... has been lack of unity” (Vickers et al. 1994). The FMLN splintered in the aftermath of the peace accords and shed its more moderate elements. While cohesion can help explain ARENA’s stronger electoral showing, the lack of unity among FMLN’s factions should have doomed it electorally. Cohesion cannot account for its positive electoral performance.

I ask of the Salvadoran case whether it was a financing advantage that bolstered ARENA both militarily and later electorally. FMLN was not a resource-rich group, but it did have robust foreign investors. Much of this funding dried up with the end of the Cold War. ARENA meanwhile had strong business connections and backing that endured postwar (Loxton 2014; Vickers et al. 1994). Greater resources proved especially relevant to campaign financing. It was estimated that ARENA spent approximately US\$12 million on the founding postwar campaign

compared to only \$270,000 by the FMLN.²⁴

Despite the attention afforded this differential campaign financing, analysts have concluded that it did not tilt the scales: “In the end, it is not clear how much difference the campaigns made. ARENA’s lavish spending did not substantially widen the gap indicated by pre-election polls” (Vickers et al. 1994). According to Wantchekon (1999), ARENA would have won “without the funding advantage.”

By war’s end, ARENA and the FMLN had carved up a great deal of El Salvador’s landscape. However, as described above, the majority of municipalities remained disputed. Moreover, allegiances became fluid (Wood 2003). ARENA won 44% of the vote even in FMLN wartime strongholds and the FMLN did surprisingly well in areas of the country such as Santa Ana and Ahuachapin where it “had had little presence before” (Vickers et al. 1994, 11). The relationship between territorial and electoral control was tenuous at best.

Past Public Goods Provision

Finally, I explore whether the relatively more powerful ARENA was able to provide the population greater wartime material benefits and was, in turn, rewarded retrospectively for doing so. The wartime government no doubt sought to win hearts and minds through civilian counter-insurgency programs such as “Municipalities in Action.” Moreover, at war’s end, ARENA ruled over a national economy, which, while not in great shape, demonstrated positive economic growth (Stahler-Sholk 1995). Despite these objective economic facts, in the lead up to the elections, 53% of the population viewed their economic situation as worsening and only 18% of the population viewed ARENA as capable of governing the country (IUDOP 1992). Even the FMLN “appeared to assume that the deteriorating standard of living and popular discontent with ARENA’s policies would automatically translate into an opposition victory [for them]” (Wolf

²⁴ Quoted in Stahler-Sholk (1995, 24).

2009). It did not; rather, ARENA far outdid its electoral prognosis based on economic retrospective votes. Such votes were seemingly not dominating the postwar ballots.

7. CONCLUSION

This article treats postwar voters as intuitive prosecutors of the violent past. They must decide whether to reject and resist or to forgive and endorse the political successors to the civil war belligerents. The existing literature on political legacies of violence assumes a direct relationship between atrocity and political reaction. However, around the world, we observe highly abusive belligerents winning postwar elections and, sub-nationally, we witness terrorized regions and individuals electing victimizers. In Colombia, even after demobilization, regions, which were most affected by the paramilitaries' campaigns of terror, voted for paramilitary-tied politicians, and paramilitary victims and non-victims supported these paramilitary-tied politicians in roughly equal measure (Daly 2017). In Guatemala, "Rios Montt's former victims voted for his party in droves" (Bateson 2015, 2). It was the most victimized Mayan populations of the western highlands, against whom Rios Montt had ordered a genocide, that voted for this dictator-turned-democrat (Kobrak 2013). In Burundi, massacred Tutsis voted *across* ethnic lines for Hutu genocideers (Nindorera 2012). This article offers a way to make sense of these counterintuitive, and perplexing, voting patterns of victimized populations at the cross-national, sub-national, and individual levels.

I argue that the relationship between atrocity and political reaction is mediated by the *framing* of the past violence and of the victimizers. How citizens remember and understand the wartime brutality is filtered by the narrative that takes hold in the nation, a narrative, I propose, which tends to be constructed and propagated by the stronger belligerent at war's end.

Citizens, as any judge or jury, consider not only the crimes committed, but also the

mitigating circumstances surrounding those crimes. Provision of peace ranks top among these extenuating facts and the stronger belligerent is able to reap the benefits of bringing such peace to the people: this end helps to justify its violent means and reduce the belligerent's culpability. The stronger belligerent's battlefield prowess also translates into a reputation for competence on security issues, which may serve it well during the highly uncertain transition from war to peace, enabling it to cull votes not only from core constituencies, but also from swelling swing voters across social sectors who worry about their safety. This is not to say that parties are always successful at spinning their past; indeed, pointing to the past is delicate and, even with great military power, parties may fail to frame history in a way that is electorally advantageous. How successor parties achieve an optimal balance between core supporters, contested voters, and former opponents in their framing of the past is a topic that merits further investigation.

This article enhances our knowledge of the path from wartime to mainstream politics. Retrospective and prospective votes, hallmarks of 'normal' elections, take hold quite quickly after war. However, rather than economics dominating this voting, security seemingly does. The cross-national data suggest a great deal of path dependency between the first and second postwar elections. The longer term electoral politics of postconflict environments, and specifically, when material voting returns, should be a subject of future inquiry (Mares and Young 2016).

A key motivation for this paper is its ability to reveal the effect of postwar electoral outcomes on peace. One path of countries emerging from civil war is back to normal politics. The other is back to war. Do the electoral outcomes explored in this article shape these trajectories? No study has examined if it matters for peace whether the successor parties win 1% or 80% of the vote. Do civil war actors really return to war if they lose the postwar elections? If former belligerents win in a landslide, do they rule differently than if they face electoral

competition? With an understanding of rebel and incumbent party success, future research may model the impact of electoral outcomes on the return to war. In so doing, this project lays the groundwork for answering pressing theoretical and policy questions.

TABLES

Table 1. Victimization and Civil War Successor Party Success

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Victimization by Your Group</i>		<i>Victimization by Your Enemy</i>		<i>Relative Victimization</i>	
	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share
Rebel_abuse	-2.84 (7.94)			-6.30 (7.88)		
Gov_abuse		0.07 (7.67)	7.56 (5.69)			
Relative_abuse					-4.59 (4.46)	-3.71 (5.62)
Constant	26.47 (15.06)	11.32 (25.12)	17.09 (14.91)	13.78 (26.47)	32.81 (17.69)	20.89 (30.17)
Observations	72	47	72	47	71	46

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors account for country clustering.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All models include controls: *un_intervention*, *powersharing*, *number_vetoplayer*s, *incompatibility*, *duration*.

Table 2. Military Strength, Victimization, and Civil War Successor Party Success

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Military Balance of Power</i>		<i>Combined Models: Military Balance of Power & Victimization</i>					
	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share	Rebel Vote share	Incumbent Vote share
Military_distr	7.64*** (2.00)	-8.03* (3.24)	7.74*** (2.11)	-8.60* (3.35)	7.30** (2.10)	-8.55* (3.82)	7.62** (2.17)	-8.35* (4.01)
Rebel_abuse			-5.62 (6.08)			-0.52 (9.38)		
Gov_abuse				0.21 (7.07)	5.42 (5.94)			
Relative_abuse							-5.17 (3.54)	-0.33 (5.80)
Constant	0.53 (15.45)	38.48 (24.62)	5.11 (16.80)	41.44 (24.63)	-2.25 (16.64)	41.63 (25.36)	12.38 (19.60)	42.19 (26.29)
Observations	74	48	72	47	72	47	71	46

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors account for country clustering.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All models include all controls: *un_intervention*, *powersharing*, *number_vetoplayers*, *incompatibility*, *duration*

Table 3. Mechanisms of Military Strength and Successor Party Success

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Coercion	Cohesion	Resources	Territorial Control	Rebel Services	Economic Crisis	Rebel Vote Share	Incumbent Vote Share
Military_distr	0.04 (0.13)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.30** (0.10)	0.00 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	8.03** (2.35)	-10.06* (4.27)
Coercion							-2.25 (2.08)	6.53 (3.55)
Cohesion							3.49 (3.94)	-1.27 (8.53)
Resources							-3.22 (5.88)	-4.84 (9.76)
Territorial Control							-0.52 (3.91)	2.20 (5.82)
Rebel Services							5.28 (4.24)	-10.01 (7.66)
Economic Crisis							5.85 (5.95)	-2.54 (8.54)
Constant	4.13*** (0.49)	0.87*** (0.13)	0.33** (0.12)	-0.13 (0.24)	0.44** (0.16)	0.35* (0.13)	4.12 (16.70)	46.84 (27.04)
Observations	131	113	132	129	131	121	62	41

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors account for country clustering.

Includes all controls: *rebel_abuse*, *un_intervention*, *powersharing*, *number_vetoplayers*, *incompatibility*, *duration*.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

References

- Allison, Michael E. 2010. "The Legacy of Violence on Post-Civil War Elections: The Case of El Salvador." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45 (1):104–124.
- Americas Watch. 1991. *El Salvador's Decade of Terror: Human Rights since the Assassination of Archbishop Romero*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Arias, Eric, Horacio A Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. 2017. Priors Rule: When do Malfeasance Revelations Help and Hurt Incumbent Parties.
- Balcells, Laia. 2011. "The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities. Evidence from Spain." *Politics & Society* 40 (3):311–347.
- Bateson, Regina. 2012. "Crime Victimization and Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 106 (3):570-587.
- Bateson, Regina. 2015. Persecution and Populism: Analyzing the Electoral Success of Guatemala's FRG. Unpublished Paper, MIT.
- Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. 2011. Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. MIT Political Science Working Paper.
- Beber, Bernd, Philip Roessler, and Alexandra Scacco. 2014. "Intergroup Violence and Political Attitudes: Evidence from a Dividing Sudan." *Journal of Politics* 76 (3):649-65.
- Berman, Eli, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter. 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119:766–819.
- Berrebi, Claude, and Esteban Klor. 2008. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 102 (3):279-301.
- Birch, S. 2003. *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Blattman, Christopher. 2009. "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103 (2):231–247.
- Bleck, Jaimie, and Kristin Michelitch. 2017. "Capturing the Airwaves, Capturing the Nation? A Field Experiment on State-Run Media Effects in the Wake of a Coup." *Journal of Politics* 79 (3):873-889.
- Boas, Taylor C, and F. Daniel Hidalgo. 2011. "Controlling the Airwaves: Incumbency Advantage and Community Radio in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (4):869–85.
- Brancati, Dawn, and Jack L. Snyder. 2012. "Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing and Sequencing on Postconflict Stability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (5):822–853.
- Canetti, D., B.J. Hall, C. Rappaport, and C. Wayne. 2013. "Exposure to Political Violence and Political Extremism: A Stress-Based Process." *European Psychology* 18 (4):263–272.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62 (1):87–119.
- CIDAI. 2004a. "El cuarto triunfo de ARENA." *Proceso* 1091.
- CIDAI. 2004b. "La campaña subterránea de ARENA." *Proceso* 1085.
- Cienfuegos, Fermán. 1982. *Commander Ferman Cienfuegos Speaks*. Los Angeles: Solidarity Committee.
- Cruz, José Miguel, and Luis Armando González. 1997. "Magnitud de la violencia en El Salvador." *Estudios Centroamericanos* 588:977-992.
- Cunningham, David E. 2006. "Veto Players and Civil War Duration." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4):875–892.
- Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2012. "Non-State Actor Data." Accessed May 5 2015. <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html>.
- Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2011. "The Roots of Coercion and Insurgency: Exploiting the Counterfactual Case of Honduras." *Conflict, Security & Development* 11 (2):145-174.
- Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2017. "Enduring Electoral Support for Politicians with Violent Legacies."

- de Figueiredo, Miguel F.P., F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Yuri Kasahara. 2013. When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil.
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/44/CEGA_ResearchRetreat2012_deFigueiredo_Paper.pdf.
- Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. 2015. UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset.
- Dickey, Christopher. 1982. "Salvadoran Rightist Mounts Vigorous Election Campaign." *The Washington Post*, 7 February.
- Egan, Patrick. 2008. Issue Ownership and Representation: A Theory of Legislative Responsiveness to Constituency Opinion. Unpublished Paper, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1239464>.
- Fearon, James D. 2004. "Why do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3):275–301.
- Fergusson, Leopoldo, Juan F. Vargas, and Mauricio A. Vela. 2013. "Sunlight Disinfects? Free Media in Weak Democracies." *Serie Documentos CEDE*.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2012. "The Effect of Elections on Post-Conflict Peace and Reconstruction." *Journal of Politics* 74 (2):558–570.
- Fortna, Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fortna, Virginia Page, and Reyko Huang. 2012. "Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise." *International Studies Quarterly*:1-8.
- Frank, Thomas. 2004. *What's the Matter with Kansas*. New York: Metropolitan Press.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5):615–637.
- Goldberg, Julie H., Jennifer S. Lerner, and Philip E. Tetlock. 1999. "Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 29 (5-6):781–95.
- Grotz, Florian, Christof Hartmann, and Dieter Nohlen. 2001. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. Volume I: Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna M. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Parties in East Central Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Högbladh, Stina. 2011. "Peace Agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset." In *States in Armed Conflict 2011*, edited by Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér. Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99.
- Holland, Alisha C. 2013. "Right on Crime? Conservative Party Politics and Mano Dura Policies in El Salvador." *Latin American Research Review* 48 (1):44-67.
- Hong, Ji Yeon, and Woo Chang Kang. 2017. "Trauma and Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of Wartime Violence on Political Attitudes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34 (3):264-286.
- Huang, Reyko. 2016. *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huber, Gregory A, Seth J Hill, and Gabriel S Lenz. 2012. "Sources of Bias in Retrospective Decision Making: Experimental Evidence on Voters' Limitations in Controlling Incumbents." *American Political Science Review* 106 (4):720-741.
- Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20 (2):191-201.
- IUDOP (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública). 1987–2010. "Public Opinion Surveys." <http://uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop>.

- Jhee, Byong-Kuen. 2008. "Economic Origins of Electoral Support for Authoritarian Successors: A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting in New Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3):362-388.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kibris, Arzu. 2011. "Funerals and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (2):220-247.
- Kobrak, Paul. 2013. "The Long War in Colotenango: Guerrillas, Army, and Civil Patrols." In *War by Other Means: Aftermath in Post-Genocide Guatemala*, edited by Carlota McAllister and Diane M. Nelson, 218-240. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2).
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2012. "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (4):869-889.
- Loxton, James Ivor. 2014. "Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building in Latin America." Ph.D. Diss, Harvard University.
- Lupu, Noam, and Leonid Peisakhin. Forthcoming. "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Lyll, Jason, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai. 2013. "Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review* 107 (4):679-705.
- Lyons, Terrence. 2002. "Postconflict Elections: War Termination, Democratization, and Demilitarizing Politics." *Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Working Paper No. 20*.
- Manning, Carrie. 2008. *The Making of Democrats: Party-Building and Elections in Post Conflict Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Mares, Isabela. 2015. *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mares, Isabela, and Lauren Young. 2016. "Buying, Stealing and Expropriating Votes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:267-288.
- Marshall, Michael Christopher, and John Ishiyama. 2016. "Does Political Inclusion of Rebel Parties Promote Peace After Civil Conflict?" *Democratization*:1-17.
- Matanock, Aila. 2017. "Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict." *International Security* 41 (4):93-132.
- McClintock, Cynthia. 1998. *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Perú's Shining Path*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
- McElhinny, Vincent J. 2006. "Inequality and Empowerment: The Political Foundations of Post-war Decentralization and Development in El Salvador, 1992-2000." PhD Diss, University of Pittsburgh.
- Newhagen, John. 1998. "Anger, Fear and Disgust: Effects on Approach-Avoidance and Memory." *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 42.
- Nindorera, Willy. 2012. "The CNDD-FD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle." *Berghof Transitions Series* 10.
- Nohlen, D., M. Krennerich, and B. Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter. 2005a. *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Volume I, North America, Central America, and the Caribbean*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter. 2005b. *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Volume II, South America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter, and Philip Stöver. 2010. *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.
- Panamá, David Ernesto. 2005. *Los guerreros de la libertad*. Andover: Versal Books.

- Petersen, Roger, and Sarah Zukerman Daly. 2010. "Revenge or Reconciliation: Theory and Method of Emotions in the Context of Colombia's Peace Process." In *Forum for International Justice and Conflict: Law in Peace Negotiations*, edited by Morten Bergsmo and Pablo Kalmanovitz. Oslo, Norway: PRIO.
- Political Handbook of the World. 1999. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Pyes, Craig. 1983. *Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots*. Albuquerque: Albuquerque Journal.
- Reno, William. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Rustad, Siri Aas, and Helga Malmin Binningsbø. 2012. "The Natural Resource Conflict Dataset: 1946-2006."
- Ryan, Malachi. 2017. "Colombia's FARC Rebrands as the Party of Peace." *Colombia Focus*, 23 August.
- Snyder, Jack, and Karen Ballentine. 1996. "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas." *International Security* 21 (2):5-40.
- Sprenkels, Ralph. 2011. "Roberto d'Aubuisson vs Schafik Handal: Militancy, Memory Work and Human Rights." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 91:15-30.
- Stahler-Sholk, Richard. 1995. "El Salvador's Negotiated Transition, From Low Intensity Conflict to Low Intensity Democracy." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 19 (1-53).
- Staniland, Paul. 2012. "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (2):243-264.
- Stanley, William D. 1996. *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Stanton, Jessica. 2016. *Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Thachil, Tariq. 2014. "Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* 108 (2):454-477.
- United Nations. 1993. *From Madness to Hope: The Twelve-Year War in El Salvador (Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador; S/25500; April)*. New York: United Nations.
- Vaishnav, Milan. 2017. *When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Vickers, George, Jack Spence, and Melrose Huff. 1994. "Elections: The Right Consolidates Power." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 28 (1):6-11.
- Wade, Christine J. 2008. "El Salvador: Contradictions of Neoliberalism and Building Sustainable Peace." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 13 (2):15-32.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 1999. "Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political Instability: The 1994 Elections in El Salvador." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (7):810-34.
- Wolf, Sonja. 2009. "Subverting Democracy: Elite Rule and the Limits to Political Participation in Post-War El Salvador." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41 (3):429-465.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2000. "Civil War and the Transformation of Elite Representation in El Salvador." In *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Kevin J Middlebrook, 223-254. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.